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Abstract 
The paper looks at the transmission channels by which the financial crisis affected the four 
emerging economies- Brazil, Russia, India and China, the degree and extent of the impact of the 
crisis, the subsequent policy interventions which enabled recovery and an assessment of how 
successful recovery has been in these economies. We conclude by noting that in the long term global 
recovery will necessitate a rebalancing of the world economy which in turn means that the hub of 
global consumption has to shift from the west to the global south, particularly to BRICs. 
 
 
 
 
“What we know about the global financial crisis is that we don’t know much.”- Paul Samuelson 
“ …the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad 
in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.” -Paul Krugman 
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I. Introduction 
Prior to the financial crisis, the global economy was going through a change. The erstwhile 
engine of global growth, the USA, was weakening and the new growth poles were emerging. 
BRIC was one of emerging growth poles that caught the imagination of the world. With a very 
large pool of physical and human resources and rapidly increasing share in global GDP growth, 
this group of heterogeneous economies were showing a great potential to replace US as an 
engine of global economic growth. This possibility was further vindicated during the financial 
crisis when BRICs managed to grow at a decent rate. Though, like other economies, this group 
also suffered from the indirect impact of financial crisis, the severity of impact felt in this block 
was much lesser as compared to many developed and developing economies. The downturn was 
shallow and recovery was relatively quick and strong. Against this backdrop, this paper attempts 
an in-depth analysis of the impact of global financial crisis on BRICs and examines its potential 
role in rebalancing of global growth.   
Broadly, the paper has been divided into seven sections. After providing a brief over view of 
BRICs economies in section two, section 3 deals with the impact of the crisis on BRICs. Section 
4 discusses the monetary and fiscal policy response to the crisis, while section five provides a 
critical assessment of recovery and issues related to exit policy. Finally, before summarizing 
paper in section seven, section six makes few observations regarding the global imbalances and 
consumption pattern in BRICs. 
II. An Overview of BRIC 
In order to understand why BRIC constitutes an important block in the geo-politics of our times 
it is important that we put into perspective what BRIC means for the world economy at large. 
Brazil, Russia, India and China together constitute roughly 25% of the total land coverage on the 
planet and are home to 40% of the world population. More than one fifth of the world GDP 
originates from these four countries and this is only set to increase in the coming years. In fact 
what captured the world’s imagination regarding BRIC was not what it was but the sheer 
potential it had in the coming decades. It is now widely believed that China will surpass US as 
the largest economy of the world by 2030; BRIC would become as big as the G7 by 2032 and 
India will become the second largest economy after China by the halfway mark of this century.2 
The recent financial crisis clearly demonstrated how resilient these economies were to external 
shocks. It is estimated that BRIC contributed 30% of the global GDP growth between 2000 and 
2008 but its contribution to global growth since 2007 was roughly 45%. Furthermore while much 
of BRIC has returned to the trend growth rate, advanced economies are just beginning to pull 
themselves out of the recession. It is expected that the former will close the output gap, which 
has been the result of the crisis at least two years before the latter will.  
In spite of the rather stellar performance of BRIC vis-a-vis the crisis it is important to note that 
structurally the four economies are quite different from each other. While agriculture contributes 
roughly 18% (Figure 1) to India’s GDP, it employs around 52% of labour; service sector on the 
other hand contributes bulk of the country’s GDP (53.4%). Agricultural productivity in China, 
very much like India, is low as indicated from its low contribution to GDP and the large share of 
labour dependent on it. The distinguishing feature in the Chinese case is that the lion’s share of 
its GDP comes from the manufacturing sector (48.1%) while it employs only 22%.  
Brazil and Russia structurally are very different from India and China especially if one takes into 
account the role of agriculture in the economy. Services play an important role in both these 
economies. Industry led by an overt dependence on oil production, makes industry crucial for 
Russia. 
Figure 2a and 2b gives a clear picture of how important trade is in the respective economies and 
how important a role services play in their trade. While China’s trade is almost 60% of its GDP, 
that for Brazil is low at 20%. Furthermore India is the only country among the four which is a net 
exporter of services and the significance of services for Indian trade is evident from the fact that 
35% of her export constitutes of services. China’s focus on manufacturing is clear from Figure 
2b where we note only 8.3% of China’s total export arises from export of services. 
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Figure 1. 
 
Source: National Sources 
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On umpteen occasions it has been argued that the impact of the financial crisis on a transition 
economy is often severe if there is a high degree of financial integration with the global 
economy. We take the ratio of  total FII flow i.e. the sum of inflow and outflow to GDP as a 
measure of financial openness. The total portfolio transaction as a percentage of GDP varies 
widely across the four economies with the corresponding Figure for Brazil being 33%.  
From the above discussion it is clear that Brazil, Russia, India and China the four economies 
under consideration are a very heterogeneous block with fundamental structural differences 
within the economies. Thus the causes and consequences and remedies for the impact of the 
crisis on the four economies will widely differ. This indicates that so far as panaceas are 
concerned a one-size-fits-all policy is best avoided. 
Figure 3.    
 
 
III. Transmission Mechanism 
 Two things are clear from the above discussion. First, the extent of structural heterogeneity 
within the economies was very high prior to the crisis. Second, the level of integration with the 
global economy was high for these countries especially in terms of trade and internal capital flow 
but these measures too varied across countries. The above facts imply that it was impossible for 
these economies to remain decoupled from the turbulence felt in rest of the world. But how did 
this shock, which emanated from the western shores of Atlantic get transmitted, to the BRIC? 
The following schematic diagram might help us understand this phenomenon. 
Figure 4 
 
We shall analyse in detail each aspect. It is important to note at this point that direct impact on 
the banking sector refers to the impact caused by a bank’s holding of toxic foreign assets. 
However a bank may also be affected when credit expansion in an economy is hurt or short term 
interest rate rises or if the general level of expectation about the future in the economy is low. 
Such an impact is may be thought of as an indirect effect. 
1. Banking Sector 
Banks and Non-bank Financial intermediaries faced limited impact due to the crisis. On one 
hand the exposure of these institutions to the complex financial instruments were limited creating 
an automatic buffer; on the other hand domestic deposits and liquidity was abundant giving a 
cushion to the banking sector, something which was hardly observed in the advanced economies. 
Sometimes it was the central banks which took proactive steps to increase countercyclical capital 
provisioning requirements. This was particularly true for Reserve Bank of India whose 
countercyclical initiatives under the leadership of YV Reddy prevented the firms from being 
exposed to the subprime crisis.3 
Financial soundness may be measured by direct exposure which is measured in terms of the 
amount of foreign assets (toxic or otherwise) owned by the domestic banks or in terms of the 
share of domestic banks’ assets owned by foreign firms. Figure 5 below illustrates the latter. This 
share was highest for Brazil (25%) and Russia (12%) indicating that any shock in the global 
economy would more promptly impact them than it would in India and China whose 
corresponding shares are much less. In India only ICICI Bank was partly exposed to the crisis 
but a strong balance sheet and timely government intervention helped it tide over the problems.4 
Thus level of financial exposure in the case of Brazil and Russia far exceeded that of India and 
China by all measures. 
Figure 5 
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There was however a decline in the financial soundness indicators, though not uniformly across 
the board, as evident from Table 1 which compares the 2005 values with the latest. The Capital 
Adequacy Ratio, which indicates how much cushion a bank has against potentially toxic assets, 
has risen across the board but mostly under statutory conditions. Other indicators like Return on 
Assets and Return on Equity have fallen except for India and China. Non-performing Liquidity 
Ratio has increased considerably for Brazil and particularly so for Russia. It has however 
decreased for India from 4.4% to 2.4% and for China from 8.6% to 1.2% indicating the overall 
financial health of Indian and Chinese financial sector is perhaps better than that of Brazil and 
Russia. A part of this reason can be traced to the proactive role of RBI in regulating. Reserve 
Bank of India was one of the few central banks in the world which introduced countercyclical 
capital provisioning requirements by increasing the provisioning requirements of the commercial 
banks lending to the real estate sector. This measure, it is widely believed, played a crucial role 
in India to prevent a potential real estate price bubble. It is also true that the Indian financial 
sector is far less developed than its Brazilian and Russian counterpart. Thus it is amply clear 
from the above discussion that the impact of the crisis on the banking sector has been varied 
among the BRIC. While India and China were hardly affected, the financial soundness indicators 
worsened, on some occasions severely for Brazil and Russia. 
1. Foreign Institutional Investments 
A strong reversal of trend was observed in the case of FIIs inflow into Brazil, Russia and India. 
While exodus of FIIs began from the Q3 of 2008 itself, that of India and Brazil began from Q4 
2008. In Q4 2008 alone, Russia lost $25billion worth FIIs while Brazil saw $20billion dollar 
make a quick exit from their economy. The corresponding Figure for India was a little under 
$6billion. After the outflow of FIIs was arrested in Q1 2009, the economies saw the first positive 
inflow in 2009Q2. FII into China was not in the least affected by the financial crisis. A major 
reason for this was the fact that like FDI, a substantial part of its FII inflow came rerouted from 
Taiwan and other similar tax havens.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
   CAR  ROA  ROE  NPL ratio  Liquidity Ratio  
   2005  L  2005  L  2005  L  2005  L  2005  L  
Brazil 
(October 
2009)  
17.89  18.2  2.9  1.5 29.5  13 3.5  4.5 55.32  53.9  
Russia 
(November 
2009)  
15.98  20.9 3.2  0.7  24.2  4.9  2.6 9.6  28.45  27.5  
India (March 
2009)  
12.8  13.2  0.9  1  13.3  12.5  5.2  2.4  11.92  11.3  
China 
(November 
2009) 
2.5 10 0.6 1.1  15.1  17.1 8.6  1.6 NA  NA  
Source: IMF  
 
2. Capital Markets 
The result of exodus of foreign institutional investment was immediately reflected in the stock 
markets. There was a general fall in the level of the market indices as is evident from the 
movements illustrated in Figure 7. We consider Indice Bolsa de Valores do Estado de São Paulo 
(IBOVESPA) for Brazil, Russian Trading System Index (RTSI) for Russia, Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) for India and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) for China. 
 
 
Figure 6. Foreign Institutional Investments 
 As expected, as FII outflow was very limited in China; the SSE continued a healthy run through 
the crisis period. For Brazil, Russia and India however the impact of the financial crisis is clearly 
felt in terms of the market indices. The downturn started somewhere around May 2008, when the 
market got the first hints from the US subprime crisis. Lehman collapse accentuated the effect 
further especially in India.  Subsequently starting from April-May 2009 the stock markets have 
shown signs of recovery. This may also be the result of abundance of liquidity in the world. The 
excess liquidity always finds a way to invest itself in high return markets, which in the current 
context mean emerging market economies. 
The collapse of the stock market indices saw a substantial drop in market capitalisation. The 
market capitalisation index for China dropped over 200 % between November 2007 and 
November 2008.  But subsequently it increased and as Figure 8b shows that market capitalisation 
as a fraction of  GDP collapsed after a steep increase in 2007 for all the BRIC countries.  
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3. Short Term Credit and FDI 
Short term credit plays an important role in emerging market economies like the BRIC. The 
corporate sectors often finds it difficult to generate sufficient investible resources domestically in 
order  to expand. Short term credit can effectively bridge the gap and help make fresh 
investments possible. Furthermore an increasing number of companies emanating from emerging 
market economies are endeavouring to expand globally. The necessary resources required to help 
finance acquisitions and mergers abroad often come from the short term credit. 
Table 25 shows that there has been a decline in short term credit for each of the BRIC economies. 
Russia in this regard was the hardest hit, with a very large decline in short term borrowing, 
especially in 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1. The extent of decline has declined substantially over the 
next three quarters but continues to e negative. Similarly short term debt declined substantially in 
Brazil. India was not affected to the extent Russia and Brazil was, is evident from the ECB 
figures. It was $-457million in 2009 Q2 and recovered soon after. China too was affected briefly 
in the second semester of 2008, though the short term credit has not returned to the pre crisis 
level. 
The significance of FDI in growth of the emerging market economies has been well 
documented6. The period of moderation was accompanied by a steady rise in FDI in these 
economies and this is believed to be one of the important reasons for the stellar performance of 
these economies in terms of economic growth. While this was not true for Russia, Brazil, India 
and China have seen a steady rise in FDI in a wide range of sectors. The onset of the global crisis 
meant the growth rate of FDI plummeted. It is estimated that for Russia in particular, it will be at 
least 2013 before it reaches the pre-crisis levels of FDI. 
It is interesting to note at this point that impact of all of the above has been reflected in the 
exchange rates. Brazil, Russia and India experienced notable appreciation in their respective 
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International Economics Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 115-135 
 
currencies, with the notable exception of China. In fact the combined currency appreciation for 
Brazil, Russia and India from 2008 Q3 to 2009 Q1 has been 38.6%, 34.72% and 13.7% 
respectively, but for China it has been only 0.25%. The figures clearly reveal what is now a well 
known secret that the Renminbi is hugely undervalued. The extent of undervaluation has been 
debated, estimates ranging from 25% to 40%. This in fact has been dubbed as an obvious form of 
protectionism and is being taken up at many multilateral forums. Significantly the above trend 
has been reversed subsequently; the next three quarters has resulted in depreciation of the 
currencies except for India  
Table 2. 
Short Term Credit in BRICs (in Millions of Dollars) 
  
Russia: 
short term 
borrowing 
Brazil: 
Short 
Term 
Debt 
India: 
ECB 
China: 
Short 
Term 
Credit 
2008Q1 12921 -56 4,827 
46727.68 2008Q2 44049 -50 1,467 
2008Q3 29990 217 1,690 
-49,830.78 2008Q4 -26178 108 3,884 
2009Q1 -16698 -3568 1,117 
2304.16 2009Q2 -3687 -9610 -457 
2009Q3 -9927 -10737 1,209 
NA 2009Q4 -10254 -1175 1,538 
Source: National Sources 
4. The Great Trade Collapse 
The global financial crisis led to what is widely acknowledged to be the steepest fall in trade 
since the World War II. Figure 10 illustrates the extent to which growth rate in total trade fell. 
We include the growth rate for the world as well to enable us to compare how the BRIC have 
performed when compared to the world average. The trade collapse began from Q3 2008 and 
lasted till Q3 2009. Q4 results indicate that recovery from this contraction has at least begun.  
Figure 9 
 
Table 3 
  Exchange Rate 
Foreign Exchange 
Reserve  
  
2008Q3-
2009Q1 
2009Q2-
2009Q4 
2008Q3-
2009Q1 
2009Q2-
2009Q4 
Brazil -38.61 16.22 7.85 -16.00 
Russia -34.73 3.34 32.35 -2.93 
India -13.69 -4.40 12.94 -1.77 
China -0.26 0.05 -2.53 -12.54 
Source: IFS, IMF 
 
The severest impact of the trade collapse is observed in Russia. It is true that trade collapse in 
Russia has been acutely felt. However a part of the reason for this decline can be traced to the 
high base effect during the same time in the previous year. Q3 2007 to Q3 2008 was the halcyon 
days for Russia since it was riding high on the back of a global crude oil price rise. The export 
values for Russia were thus inflated which next year resulted in the high base – a phenomenon 
we discussed above. 
 Figure 10 
 
This is further evident from Table 4.  Growth Rate of export hovered around 68% each quarter 
for the first three quarters for Russia. It however plummeted to -52.4% in the first quarter of 
2009. This dip continued for three quarters in succession. Note that the drop in export was led by 
drop in export of goods, primarily export of crude oil. In fact it was not so much the volume of 
petroleum export that was affected but the value of it. The sharp decline in international prices of 
crude oil led a sharp decrease in the value of oil exported from China. The fact that share of 
services in total export continued to rise during the peak of the crisis period also suggest that it is 
the drop in export of goods which led to the sharp decline in export for Russia. 
A similar phenomenon is observed in the case of Chine. Growth of export declined to -22.2% in 
the first semester of 2009. However during this period the share of services in total export 
increased to 0.11 from 0.10 indicating that growth of export of manufactured products has 
declined at a greater rate than that of services.  
For India services constitute the major part of its export basket. While export did drop in India, 
the decline is much less than that observed in others, especially Brazil and Russia. This is 
primarily due to the fact that decline in services export has been rather mitigated. Export growth 
in services saw maximum dip of -14% in Q3 2009. Given that services play by far the most 
significant role in India’s export basket, one may conclude that the limited impact on India’s 
trade may be attributed to the cushioned effect on its services sector. However here are some 
indications that there has been a lagged effect on export of services.  
Table 4 
Count
ry   
Brazil  Russia  India  China  
 Indic
ator  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort 
of 
servi
ces  
Shar
e of 
Servi
ces 
in 
Tota
l 
Expo
rt  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort 
of 
servi
ces  
Shar
e of 
Servi
ces 
in 
Tota
l 
Expo
rt  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort 
of 
servi
ces  
Shar
e of 
Servi
ces 
in 
Tota
l 
Expo
rt  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort  
Gro
wth 
of 
Exp
ort 
of 
servi
ces  
Shar
e of 
Servi
ces 
in 
Tota
l 
Expo
rt  
2008
Q1  
13.8 25 0.19 68 34.7 0.09 25.8 3.3 0.61 22.4 29 0.08 
2008
Q2  
32.5 31.6 0.13 67.2 42.9 0.1 37.4 22.5 0.47 
2008
Q3  
38.8 38.8 0.14 69.3 36 0.1 30.3 47 0.57 13.6 13.1 0.1 
2008
Q4  
6.9 15.5 0.17 1.2 11.8 0.12 -11.9 9.3 0.7 
2009
Q1  
-19.4 -6.5 0.22 -52.4 -18.8 0.15 -7 -6.9 0.61 -22.2 -23.8 0.11 
2009
Q2  
-25.4 -14 0.15 -51.3 -19.7 0.16 -22.8 -10.4 0.54 
2009
Q3  
-30.5 -15.2 0.17 -45.6 -22.4 0.14 -14.4 -14.4 0.5 NA  NA  NA  
2009
Q4  
-12.5 -0.1 0.19 -13.8 -12.3 0.12 19.8 -9.3 0.53 
5. Effect on the Real sector 
The BRIC economies were cruising along well until the financial crisis hit the world economy. 
As is clear from Figure 11.a the growth rate ranged from a moderate 6 per cent to a high 11 per 
cent. From 2008 Q3 onwards the impact of the crisis was felt by each economy in a distinct way. 
While on hand China and India weathered the crisis pretty well with growth rates remaining 
above the 5 per cent mark throughout and peaking up sharply subsequently from 2009 Q4, on the 
other hand quarterly GDP growth rate for Brazil and Russia in particular plummeted. In fact for 
three subsequent quarters beginning from 2008 Q4 the GDP growth rate hovered around -10 per 
cent. The same for Brazil was in red until 2009 Q4 when it showed the first signs of recovery. 
When we analyzed the structural differences in the four economies, we noted that the degree of 
financial integration (as distinct from real sector integration) differed widely in the four 
economies. While Brazil and Russia was highly integrated, India and China was not. No wonder 
then that the latter was not hit as hard as the former. Greater financial integration for Brazil and  
Russia meant that the numerous transmission channels which were at work more readily affected 
them than it did the rest.  
Figure 11.b compares the quarterly growth rates of the BRIC economies with that of the 
Emerging Economies, Advanced Economies and the world. Q4 2008 and Q1 2009 was the 
period when the economies were hardest hit and advanced economies grew at around -8 per cent 
for the two quarters. The trough is clearly evident for the world economy and the emerging 
market economies as well, however the BRIC economies as a whole have clearly escaped the 
magnitude of recession experienced by the others. Whatever little dip we see in the growth rates 
are because of the effect on Brazil and Russia. This comparative picture illustrates the resilience 
of the BRIC economies in the face of an acute global economic meltdown. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.a 
 
 
Figureure 11.b 
 
IV. Policy Responses 
1. Fiscal Policy Response 
It was agreed by the world leaders that a coordinated fiscal response was required to pull the 
world economy out of the recession. After decades of irreverence, Keynesian policies and its 
variants came to dominate the centre stage of world economic policy formulations. 
 The extent and depth of fiscal policy interventions have been a matter of debate. However we 
distinguish here between financial packages from offered by various countries from fiscal 
responses, unlike many other papers. This distinction is important since financial packages 
offered by various countries to banks and other financial institutions posing systemic risks to the 
economy essentially aim at asset swaps, bank injections, loan guarantees. The impact of this, in 
terms of spur in general demand of the economy, is indirect. Fiscal stimulus on the other, by way 
of tax cuts and public spending on goods and services, aim directly at inducing demand in the 
economy.    
We consider here the direct fiscal responses by the BRIC economies and contrast them with that 
of some of the advanced economies in Figure 11. 
Figure 11 7 
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The size of the aggregate global fiscal stimulus is about $1957.97 billion, roughly 3.16% of 
world GDP. Out of this United States’ and Chinese response constituted of a whopping 40% and 
30% respectively. Us and China were by far the largest contributor to the aggregate stimulus. 
Germany pledged 5% and UK, France and Russia pledged 2% each of the world total. India and 
Brazil pledged only 0.3% of the world total. In terms of their 2008 GDP Brazil, Russia, India and 
China put forth a stimulus of 0.3%, 1.7%, 0.5% and 6.9% respectively.  
What is interesting to note here is that the nature of the stimulus in the four countries differed in 
terms of whether the stimulus was tax cut induced or spending led. The impact of the two has 
been known to be different. Alesina and Ardagna (2009) found from data starting from 1977 to 
2007 that in US tax cut induced fiscal measures have contributed to growth more than direct 
spending.  Table 5 shows us that while Brazil and Russia predominantly went the tax-cut way, 
India and China preferred direct public spending. Brazil in fact took this opportunity to extend 
the widely hailed and highly successful BOLSA program; the minimum wage was increased by 
12% and a host of tax concessions to spur private consumption demand. 
China invested massively in rural infrastructure, railways, airport, power grids etc. It 
endeavoured to extend social security to much of its population by way of increasing the number 
of pension funds, offering farm subsidies and providing low rent housing to its citizens. It 
however also offered direct tax concessions to nine of its major industries. 
Incidentally the Indian Union budget 2008-09, announced in March 2008, was an expansionary 
one. It was essentially electoral considerations which led to pay commission rewards and major 
food and fertiliser subsidy. Substantial part of the outlay was earmarked for National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme and farm loan waiver scheme. It was fortuitous that months 
before the crisis hit the world, India was already on an expansionary drive, rendering post crisis 
fiscal intervention less necessary. However, it did offer fiscal stimulus by investing in 
infrastructure and providing indirect tax concessions and giving assistance to the export industry. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Fiscal Responses and Classifications8 
            Fiscal Stimulus Classification of Fiscal Measures 
Countr
y 
USD 
amoun
t (bb) 
Percen
t 2008 
GDP 
Tax 
Cut/Spendin
g 
Public 
Spending on 
Goods and 
Services 
Stimulus 
aimed at 
consumers 
Stimulus 
aimed at firms 
Brazil 5.1 0.3 T 
  
extension of 
the BOLSA 
program; 
increase in 
minimum 
wage by 
12%; tax 
cuts on 
consumer 
loan and 
personal 
income to 
boost sales 
tax cuts to auto 
manufacturers 
Russia 30 1.7 T   tax cuts tax cuts 
India 6.5 0.5 S 
spending on 
roads, ports 
and 
infrastructure 
  
cut in excise 
duties for 
export and 
labor intensive 
sectors 
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China 586 6.9 S 
massive 
investment in 
rural 
infrastructure
, railways, 
airport, 
power grids 
etc. 
increase in 
the number 
of pension 
funds, farm 
subsidies, 
low rent 
housing 
developmen
t 
direct tax cuts 
for 9 
industries(steel
, telecom, auto 
included), 
removal of 
loan quotas on 
commercial 
investors 
Source: IILS, Bloomberg, National Media 
 
2. Monetary Policy Response 
The overarching objective of the monetary response had been to inject credit into the system and 
thus spur aggregate demand and growth. The Bank Rate of People’s Bank of China reduced from 
4.14% to 2.79%  in December 2008 and has stayed at that for quite some time now. Reserve 
Bank of India slashed reverse repo rate from 6% to 3.25%, repo rate from 8% to 4.75%, CRR 
and SLR too were reduced from 9% to 5% and 25% to 24% respectively in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis. Russia drastically reduced its required reserve ratio from 7% in 
September 2008 to 0.5% in November 2008 to pump liquidity into the economy. The SELIC 
Policy rate in Brazil was brought down to a historic low of 8.75%. It is important to note at this 
point that Brazil and Latin American economies in general, have an inherent tendency to 
overheat resulting in inflationary trends. Inflation targeting has always been an important 
objective for the central bank and a high interest rate regime has been maintained in Brazil. 
Though over the years the equilibrium interest rate has been declining, this extent decline has 
been unprecedented. We shall evaluate the impact of the above mentioned monetary policy 
interventions on credit in the section below. 
V. Recovery and Exit Policy 
As discussed above following the financial crisis, there was a coordinated effort by the major 
economies to give a fillip to aggregate demand in the economy by means of fiscal and monetary 
response. The world economy recovered earlier than expected. United States registered a positive 
GDP growth of 2.2% and 5.6% in the third and fourth quarter of 2009 respectively. The green 
shoots of recovery in the global economy were evident from the third quarter itself. Let us 
examine how the BRIC economies fared. 
Figure 12.a and 12.b gives us an indication of the extent of recovery in terms of production and 
sales. The production index of Brazil has gone up from Q1 2009 after a notable decline. For 
India the production index had plateaued during the peak of the crisis in Q3 and Q4 3008 but has 
since then shown a steady rise. The increase in Russian production index has been very gradual 
post Q2 2009. This may be in explained in part by the fact that the sales index for Russia has not 
picked up significantly. While demand from consumers in Brazil have clearly picked up, 
whatever little increase in production in Russia may be entirely from replenishment of depleted 
inventory.  
Figure 12.a               Figure 12.b 
  
Source: OECD 
The world recovery has been accompanied by a substantial increase in world trade. World and 
Chinese export have risen sharply to the pre-crisis levels after a sharp dip. The export from 
Russia has also picked up; the major part of this has come from an increase in oil price though. 
The consensus view on world growth is that double dip is unlikely to happen, but the recovery 
will be gradual. The same has been forecast for BRIC as well. While India and China has already 
reached their trend growth rate, Brazil and Russia will do so by Q3 2010. Figure 14 clearly 
shows that Russia has been the hardest hit in terms of GDP Growth rate and will take the longest 
to close the output gap. 
Figure 13 
 
Source: IFS, IMF 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 
 
Source: IMF 
VI. Global imbalance and consumption pattern in BRIC 
Of the many reasons which have been attributed to the causes of financial crisis, it is widely 
believed by economists that global imbalances have played an important role. It has certainly 
played a role in perpetuating the crisis if not causing it directly. United States has historically had 
a current account deficit of around 6.5% of its GDP. Post crisis, following a drop in international 
crude oil prices, slow growth and falling imports the current account deficit has fallen and it is 
expected to be 4% in the near term. However according to an estimate from Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, in the long term it is expected to be $5 trillion annually, more than 10% 
of US GDP9. What continues to drive this current account deficit in US? 
The answer may be found in the consumption pattern in US. Personal and Government 
consumption together constituted 88.7% of GDP and personal consumption itself constituted 
around 70.7% of GDP in the US in 2008. Economists argue that this high level of consumption 
in the US and its natural corollary a corresponding high level of saving in emerging economies, 
particularly China and other oil exporting countries is unsustainable. What is i necessary thus is 
                                                      
9 http://www.iie.com/research/topics/hottopic.cfm?HotTopicID=9 
global rebalancing. We will examine if BRIC can play a role in causing this shift in consumption 
from the west towards the emerging market economies. 
Figure 15 
  
Source: Goldman Sachs 
It is clear from Figure 15 that penetration of goods (number of a particular good per hundred 
people) as estimated for the six different product groups in the four countries has been rather 
low. Russia is by far the most mature consumer market. Brazil is a close second. This is evident 
from the fact that the per capita income of the India and China are much lower than that of Brazil 
and Russia. Penetration of goods is the weakest in India. The level of penetration in the case 
broadband and personal computers is very low for the all the four countries indicating a potential 
in the near future. While there are about 19 and 17 automobiles per hundred people in Russia and 
Brazil respectively, that for India and China is negligible. Though India is a laggard in all 
respects, it is currently experiencing phenomenal growth rates in some consumer goods sectors 
like mobile telephony, personal computing, internet and cars.  
As per capita income continues to rise in the BRIC, the burgeoning middle class, especially in 
India and China will drive the consumption and result in its shift from the rich countries to the 
emerging market economies. 
Figure 16 
 
Source: IFS, IMF 
Economic theory suggests that at low levels of income, people consume more and save less. This 
is driven by the fact that a only when a bare minimum level of subsistence consumption is met, 
one intends to address issues like inter temporal consumption and thus saving. As income rises, 
consumption levels fall relative to income and finally when income exceeds a threshold level, the 
consumption to income ratio rises again. The economic rationale of the third stage lies is that 
when at higher levels of income the basic necessities of living are taken care of and there exists a 
well knit social safety net individuals tend to consume higher end products leading to a rise in 
the consumption income ratio.  
The above theorisation is empirically validated as well. The relation between per capita GDP and 
Consumption GDP ratio has been found to be a U shape. Low PCI countries tend to have a 
higher C/GDP and this is set to decrease initially and finally increase again where high per capita 
income countries consume more relative to their income. Figure 16 suggests this relationship 
holds true for BRIC as well. While Brazil and Russia lies on the right of the trough of the U, 
India lies on the left and China at the bottom of the U. Thus for China the consumption-GDP 
ratio is all set to increase while India has not even begun to traverse the cycle. Evident thus is the 
fact that consumption China is set to increase in the coming days. For India the consumption 
level in itself is set to rise, however India’s GDP is set to increase at an even higher rate. Thus 
the Consumption GDP ratio will initially decline and then rise again. 
A vexing question still remains. Why has the consumption relative to income not risen to the 
same extent as income itself? Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis professes that 
transitory or short term changes in income does not change the level of consumption, what 
changes the consumption level is the long term income expectations. It is possible that the 
consumers in the emerging market economies perceive the increases in income as transitory; 
once this rise gets a seal of permanence, the consumption levels are going to rise.   On an 
aggregate thus a rise in consumption-GDP ratio follows a rise in income level but with a lag. 
Possibly this is the phenomenon we are observing in emerging markets in general and BRIC in 
particular. One must note though that Brazil to some extent and Russia in particular does not 
share the consumption characteristics  of India and China and the consumption potential in the 
former is much less than that in the latter. 
Rebalancing in the world economy, inter alia implies shift in the consumption from advanced 
economies to the emerging market economies. This ipso facto means a reduction in savings in 
the emerging economies and a corresponding increase in saving in the west. Our analysis shows 
that this transition from high-saving low-consumption to moderate-saving high-consumption 
phenomenon is feasible in the transition economies and BRIC can play an important part in it. 
VII. Conclusion 
In line with the global experience, BRICs also suffered from the financial crisis that griped the 
global economy toward the end of 2008. However, the severity of the impact was not uniform 
across all these economies. With a higher level of financial integration, Brazil and Russia 
suffered the most while India and china experienced only a moderate slow down in their GDP 
growth. Depending on the fiscal space all BRIC economies announced fiscal stimulus to abort 
the contagion of financial crisis. The biggest fiscal stimulus was announced by China followed 
by Russia, India and Brazil. Apart from size, the fiscal responses of these economies also differ 
in nature. While Brazil and Russia went for tax rebate to shore up the private demand, India and 
China opted for direct public spending on infrastructure development. Interestingly Brazil took 
this opportunity to extend its widely hailed and highly successful BOLSA program and raised the 
minimum wage by 12 percent. The monetary policy response was rather simple and uniforms. 
All economies reduced interest, with Russia going for most the liberal monetary policy regime.      
The liberal monetary policy along with fiscal expansion helped BRICs to recover sooner rather 
than later. The recovery was first observed in India and China during the first quarter of 2009 
when these economies witnessed a turnaround in their GDP growth. Brazil also embarked on the 
path of recovery in the fourth quarter of 2009 followed by Russia in the first quarter of 2010. 
However, in case of Brazil and Russia, the economic recovery is still fragile and hence 
government should continue with expansionary policies. In the long run it is imperative that the 
global economy is rebalanced and BRIC has to play an important role in ensuring that the 
rebalancing takes place.  
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